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TORTS-PARENT -CHILD IMMUNITY: PARENT -CHILD 
TORT IMMUNITY DEFENSE IS APPLICABLE IN 
WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL ACTIONS DESPITE 
THE MODERN TREND TOWARD ABROGATION OF THE 
DOCTRINE. Smith v. Gross, 319 Md. 138, 571 A.2d 1219 
(1990). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the last several decades there has been a substantial erosion 
of the parent-child immunity doctrine, which allows a parent to 
escape liability for torts committed against a child. l This erosion has 
come in the form of exceptions to the doctrine in cases where courts 
have recognized that application of the immunity would not serve 
the policies behind the doctrine. 2 
In Smith v. Gross,3 however, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
reaffirmed its commitment to the parental immunity doctrine. The 
court in Smith held that neither a wrongful death action nor a 
survival action could be maintained against a defendant who could 
have used the immunity defense against the decedent had the decedent 
lived. 4 Although this decision is consistent with Maryland precedent, 
it runs counter to the modern trend of abrogating the rule in cases 
where the policy underlying the rule cannot be furthered. 5 
II. BACKGROUND 
At English common law a child was considered to be a separate 
legal person from his or her parents.6 As such, a child was entitled 
;. See Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 561, 568-87, 505 A.2d 826, 836, 840-49 (1986). 
2. See Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 13 (Alaska 1967) (immunity doctrine will not 
bar a motor tort action because liability insurance negates the concern for 
family harmony); Attwood v. Estate of Attwood, 276 Ark. 230, 238, 633 
S.W.2d 366, 370 (1982) (immunity doctrine will not bar an action for injuries 
caused by willful and wanton conduct); Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, 200 Conn. 290, 
291, 512 A.2d 130, 133 (1986) (immunity doctrine will not bar an action for 
injury sustained by minor at father's work site). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 895G comments d - i (1979). 
3. 319 Md. 138, 571 A.2d 1219 (1990). 
4. Id. at 149, 571 A.2d at 1224. 
5. See, e.g., Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 8950 comments d - i (1979); 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 
O. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 8.11 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter HARPER). 
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8950 comment b (1979); W. PROSSER 
& W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 122, at 904 (5th ed. 1984). 
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to own property and enter into contracts.7 The child could bring suit 
against all others, including his or her parents, regarding these 
property and contract rights. 8 A child could also maintain a criminal 
action against a parent if the parent acted unreasonably in disciplining 
the child.9 Although it is unclear whether a child could maintain a 
personal tort action against a parent, there are no decisions indicating 
that such an action would not lie, subject only to the parent's privilege 
to reasonably discipline the child. IO 
In 1891, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held in Hewlett v. 
Georgell that a minor child could not maintain a personal tort action 
against a parent. 12 In Hewlett, a daughter alleged that her mother 
had willfully and maliciously imprisoned her in an insane asylum so 
her mother could obtain her property. The court in Hewlett fashioned 
the parent-child immunity doctrine on the principle that permitting 
the suit would disrupt the family peace. 13 The court reasoned that 
the state's criminal laws would provide the daughter with adequate 
protection. 14 
Even though the court in Hewlett cited no supporting authority, 
many courts adopted the parent-child immunity doctrine in both 
intentional and negligent tort actions. IS Numerous courts adopted the 
doctrine based on the theory that family unity and tranquility must 
7. HARPER, supra note 5; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 6. See generally, 
Akers & Drummond, Tort Actions Between Members of the Family - Husband 
& Wife - Parent & Child, 26 Mo. L. REV. 152 (1961). 
8. See Young v. Wiley, 183 Ind. 449, 107 N.E. 278 (1914); Clark v. Smith, 13 
S.c. 585 (1879). 
9. See Neal v. State, 54 Ga. 281 (1874); Hinkle v. State, 127 Ind. 490, 26 N.E. 
777 (1891). 
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G comment b (1979); HARPER; 
McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 VILL. L. REV. 521, 527 (1960). 
11. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). 
12. [d. at 705, 9 So. at 887. 
13. The Hewlett court reasoned: 
[Sjo long as the parent is under obligation to care for, guide, and 
control, and the child is under reciprocal obligation to aid and comfort 
and obey, no such action as this can be maintained. The peace of 
society ... [deniesj the minor child a right to appear in court in the 
assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at 
the hands of the parent. 
[d. at 705, 9 So. at 887. 
14. Hewlett, 68 Miss. 703, 704, 9 So. 885, 887 (1891). 
15. See, e.g., Materese v. Materese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925) (no action 
permitted where a child is injured while a passenger in automobile negligently 
operated by parent); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 
(1903) (no action permitted when minor child is beaten by parents); Roller v. 
Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905) (civil action precluded against· father 
convicted of raping daughter). 
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be preserved. 16 Others reasoned that parents must be allowed a certain 
measure of discretion in the discipline and care of their children. 17 
Still others determined that a family's financial resources must be 
protected from the disproportionate enrichment of the plaintiff family 
member. 18 
In 1930, Maryland adopted the parent-child immunity doctrine 
in Schneider v. Schneider,19 holding that a parent could not sue a 
minor child for injuries resulting from the child's negligent driving. 20 
The court in Schneider reasoned that a parent could not simultane-
ously stand in the roles of adversary and guardian.21 The court stated, 
"A right of action at law is not one open to any and all persons 
against any others, without reference to relationships which may exist 
between them. "22 
In 1971, in Latz v. LatZ,23 the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland, bound by the Schneider decision, held that parental im-
munity applied to bar a plaintiff-parent from maintaining a wrongful 
death action against a minor child.24 In Latz, a parent was killed 
while a passenger in an automobile negligently driven by her une-
mancipated, minor daughter. While noting the trend of abrogating 
the parent-child immunity doctrine, the court chose to leave such 
abrogation in Maryland to the legislature. 25 
In Frye v. Frye,26 the Court of Appeals of Maryland reaffirmed 
its commitment to the parental immunity rule with respect to motor 
torts.27 In Frye, a child was injured by his father's negligent driving. 
In dismissing the child's tort action, the court of appeals stressed 
the policies of fostering family harmony and supporting parental 
authority.28 The court also stated that because statutory public policies 
16. See, e.g., McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S. W. 664. See generally Annotation, 
Liability of Parent for Injury to Unemancipated Child Caused by Parent's 
Negligence, Modern Cases, 6 A.L.R.3d 1066 (1981). 
17. See, e.g., Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938), rev'd, 369 
Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d 907 (1975). 
18. See, e.g., Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923). 
19. 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930). 
20. Id. at 22-23, 152 A. at 499. 
21. /d. 
22.Id. 
23. 10 Md. App. 720, 272 A.2d 435, cert. denied, 261 Md. 726 (1971). 
24. Id. at 725, 272 A.2d 438. 
25. Id. at 734, 272 A.2d 442-43. 
26. 305 Md. 542, 505 A.2d 826 (1986). 
27. The court in Frye distinguished its recent abrogation of interspousal immunity 
in Boblitz v. Boblitz, 269 Md. 242, 462 A. 2d 506 (1983) from parent-child 
immunity. The court of appeals stated that the two immunities are distinguish-
able in that they are based on separate policies and have different legal histories. 
Frye, 305 Md. at 557-58, 505 A.2d at 834. 
28. Frye, 305 Md. at 557-58, 567, 505 A.2d at 834, 839. 
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concerning compulsory liability insurance laws and family unity would 
be affected by abrogation of the parent-child immunity doctrine, the 
legislature, not the judiciary, should effect the abrogation.29 
Commentators, however, have sharply criticized the parent-child 
immunity rule. 30 One criticism is that the justifications for the rule 
do not outweigh the importance of compensating the injured person.31 
Other critics argue that it is absurd to believe that an uncompensated 
tort makes for family peace and tranquility. 32 Finally, some critics 
argue that the scope of the immunity doctrine is too broad, and 
should be replaced with a narrower parental privilege applying only 
to those actions growing directly out of the family relationship.33 
Responding to the potentially unjust results of the immunity 
doctrine, many courts created exceptions to the doctrine in cases 
where the underlying policies could not be furthered by its applica-
tion. Thus, courts allowed suits between parents and emancipated 
children.34 Similarly, exceptions were made where the parent and 
29. Id. at 567, 505 A.2d at 839. 
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G (1979); HARPER, supra note 5, 
at 574-81; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 6, at 905-06. See generally 
Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 50 
FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 496-508 (1982) (critically analyzing the rationales in 
support of the parent-child immunity doctrine). 
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G comment c (1979). As the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Maine stated: 
The strong trend against the across-the-board application of a 
rule of parental immunity in tort cases reflects a growing rec-
ognition that such a sweeping application results in excessive 
protection of the interests favored by the rule in derogation of 
the general principle that there should be no wrong without a 
remedy. 
Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634, 635 (Me. 1979). 
32. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 905. 
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8950 comment j (1979); see also 
Framm, Parent-Child Tort Immunity: Time For Maryland to Abrogate an 
Anachronism, 11 U. BALT. L. REV. 435, 466 (1982). 
A growing minority of jurisdictions have completely abrogated the parent-
child immunity doctrine, replacing it with more flexible rules revolving around 
parental privilege. Many abrogating courts reasoned that it is the injury itself, 
not the suit, that disrupts family life. The Wisconsin Supreme Court took the 
lead in abrogating the immunity doctrine in Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 
122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). The Goller court held that no immunity existed except 
in situations incident to the parental role. Id. at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198. In 
Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971), the 
California Supreme Court abrogated the immunity rule and held that the 
standard should be that of a reasonable and prudent parent. Gibson, 3 Cal. 
3d at 921, 479 P.2d at 653,92 Cal. Rptr. at 293. Accord Anderson v. Stream, 
295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980). 
34. See, e.g., Waltzinger v. Birsner, 212 Md. 107, 128 A.2d 617 (1956). The court 
of appeals reasoned that the need for parental discretion was absent due to 
1990] Parent-Child Immunity 281 
child stood in a business relationship and the Injury arose out of 
that relationship.3s Courts reasoned that the parent was not acting 
in a parental role at the time of the injury, and therefore, should 
not be entitled to use the parent-child immunity defense. 36 Numerous 
courts abrogated the immunity with respect to automobile accidentsY 
Others permitted wrongful death and survival actions, reasoning that 
because the parent-child relationship was terminated by death the 
policy of upholding the unity of that relationship was inapplicable.38 
In Mahnke v. Moore,39 the Court of Appeals of Maryland carved 
out an exception to the immunity rule for "injuries resulting from 
cruel and inhuman treatment or for malicious and wanton wrongs."4O 
In Mahnke, a young girl was forced to watch her father murder her 
mother, spend a week with the corpse, and then watch her father 
commit suicide. The court in Mahnke held that the father had 
abandoned his parental obligation and destroyed the family unity by 
his conduct, thereby forfeiting his right to use the immunity defense. 41 
the child's majority. [d. at 126, 128 A.2d at 627. 
There are five methods by which a child may become emancipated: (1) by 
written or oral agreement or by some act the parent relinquishes control; (2) 
the parent abandons, neglects, or is cruel to the child; (3) the child enters into 
a valid marriage; (4) the child reaches the statutory age of majority; and (5) 
the child enlists in the military. Note, Right of Action of a Minor Child 
Against a Parent Tort Feasor, 12 MD. L. REv. 202, 211 (1951). 
35. See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930); see also Hatzinicolas 
v. Protopapas, 314 Md. 340, 550 A.2d 947 (1988) (parent-child immunity will 
not bar a child's recovery in negligence from a parent's business partner, where 
the partnership was responsible for an injury and partner is entitled to contri-
bution from the parent partner). 
36. See Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928 (1971); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W.Va. 
17, 19, 166 S.E. 538, 539 (1932). 
37. See Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d 907 (1975) (immunity is 
abrogated to the extent of parent's automobile liability insurance); Smith v. 
Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971) (high incidence of vehicle 
liability insurance has made parent-child immunity anachronistic as applied to 
automobile accident litigation); Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669 (Del. 1976) 
(parent-child immunity does not apply to the extent of automobile liability 
insurance). But see Schneider v. Coe, 402 A.2d 682 (Del. 1979) (immunity is 
applicable where duty arises from family relationship notwithstanding existence 
of insurance). 
38. See Harlan Nat'l Bank v. Gross, 346 S.W.2d 482 (Ky. 1961) (wrongful death 
action based on alleged negligent driving permitted because policy behind 
immunity rule is inapplicable due to death of child). Accord Johnson v. Myers, 
2 Ill. App. 3d 844, 277 N.E.2d 778 (1972); Plumley v. Klein, 31 Mich. App. 
26,187 N.W.2d 250 (1971), aff'd, 388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972); Palcsey 
v. Tepper, 71 N.J. Super. 294, 176 A.2d 818 (1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 895G comment g (1977). 
39. 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951). 
40. [d. at 68, 77 A.2d at 926. 
41. [d. The court stated: 
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The court of appeals emphasized that it was making an exception to 
the parent-child immunity rule because the policies underlying the 
rule could not be served by its application. 
In addition to the exception for outrageous intentional torts, 
Maryland has also abrogated the parent-child immunity doctrine for 
emancipated children. In Waltzinger v. Birsner,42 a parent was injured 
while riding in an automobile operated in an allegedly negligent 
manner by her emancipated adult son. In allowing the action, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland reasoned that the need for parental 
discretion was absent because of the child's majority.43 
Despite these exceptions, Maryland has refused to follow the 
modern trend of abrogating the rule with respect to negligence cases, 
and especially automobile accident cases. Instead, Maryland continues 
to cling to the seminal case of Schneider by applying the parent-
child immunity doctrine to .negligent automobile accident cases. In 
Smith v. Gross,44 the Court of Appeals of Maryland applied this 
archaic doctrine to a case where alleged negligence resulted in the 
death of a child. 
III. FACTS 
In Smith, two-year-old Roland Randolph Gross, Jr. was killed 
in an automobile accident, allegedly resulting from his natural father's 
negligent driving.4s The child was born out of wedlock to Virginia 
Lee Smith and Roland Randolph Gross, Sr. Their son had always 
lived with his natural mother, never with his father. 46 The child's 
mother, as both the personal representative of the child's estate and 
in her individual capacity as mother, brought a wrongful death 
Id. 
[T]here can be no basis for the contention that the daughter's suit 
against her father's estate would be contrary to public policy, for the 
simple reason that there is no home at all in which discipline and 
tranquility are to be preserved ... [w]hen, as in this case, the parent 
is guilty of acts which show complete abandonment of the parental 
relation, the rule giving him immunity from suit by the child, on the 
ground that discipline should be maintained in the home, cannot 
logically be applied, for when he is guilty of such acts he forfeits his 
parental authority and privileges, including his immunity from suit. 
42. 212 Md. 107, 128 A.2d at 617 (1957). 
43. Id. at 126, 128 A.2d at 627. 
44. 319 Md. 138, 571 A.2d 1219 (1990). 
45. Id. at 141, 571 A.2d at 1220. 
46. The court noted that the child's illegitimacy was irrelevant to the decision. The 
rule attached in this case because the father was the child's natural father. Id. 
at 146 n.5, 571 A.2d at 1222 n.5. 
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action47 and a survival action48 against the father. 49 She claimed 
punitive damages in both actions.50 Applying the parent-child im-
munity rule, the Circuit Court for Dorchester County granted the 
father's motion to dismiss the actions for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted.51 The mother appealed, and the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland certified the case ex mero motu before 
a decision by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.52 
IV. REASONING/HOLDING 
In wrongful death and survival actions, the general rule is that 
defenses which would have been good against the decedent, had the 
decedent lived, are also good against the decedent's personal repre-
sentatives and survivors.53 The issue presented in Smith was whether 
the parental immunity defense is a defense that may be raised by 
operation of this general rule. 54 In affirming the circuit court's 
dismissal, the court of appeals held that the parental immunity 
defense may be raised in such actions, thereby precluding the mother 
from proceeding against the father both in her own right as a parent 
and as the personal representative of the child's estate.55 Consistent 
with Maryland precedent,56 the court stated that parental immunity 
bars all negligence actions, and specifically those· actions involving 
motor tortsY In upholding the parent-child immunity doctrine, the 
court of appeals emphasized the importance of protecting the family 
integrity and supporting parental discretion in the discipline and care 
of the child. 58 
The court acknowledged that its continued refusal to abrogate 
the parent-child immunity rule for motor torts is inconsistent with 
47. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN., §§ 3-901 to 3-904 (1989). "Wrongful 
act" is defined as "an act, neglect, or default including a felonious act which 
would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages 
if death had not ensued." Id. at § 3-901(e). 
48. See MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 7-401(x) (1974). 




53. Id. at 144-45, 571 A.2d at 1221-22. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 149, 571 A.2d at 1224. 
56. Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 505 A.2d 826 (1986); Yost v. Yost, 172 Md. 128, 
190 A. 753 (1937) (child cannot sue a parent for non-support; a parent is 
generally not liable for passive negligence incident to the parental relation); 
Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930). 
57. Smith, 319 Md. at 145, 571 A.2d at 1222. 
58. Id. at 147-48, 571 A.2d 1222-23. 
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the modern trend.59 In support of its holding, the court cited Frye, 
in which it had stated that because the legislature had enacted 
compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance laws, and failed to make 
an exception to the immunity rule in motor tort cases, the judiciary 
should not do so on its own. 60 The court in Frye reasoned that 
because insurance laws are part of an elaborate scheme created for 
the general welfare and protection of Maryland's citizens, any excep-
tion that would affect the· scheme is best left to the legislature.61 
Consistent with this precedent, the Smith court refused to make an 
exception to the immunity rule which would impact Maryland's 
wrongful death and survival statutes. The court stated that the 
General Assembly has had ample opportunity to legislate such an 
exception, if that was its intent. 62 
Significantly, the court in Smith refused to make an exception 
to the immunity rule in a situation where negligence results in the 
death of a child. After noting the general rule that defenses which 
would have been good against the decedent, had the decedent lived, 
are also good against the decedent's personal representatives and 
survivors,63 the court found that a parental relationship did exist 
between the defendant-father and the child at the time of the acci-
dent. 64 The court then reasoned that because the parent-child im-
munity rule was applicable during the life of the child, the mother's 
actions were barred under both the survival and wrongful death 
statutes.65 Without further elaboration the court stated, "The death 
of the child did not serve to remove the immunity dictated by the 
rule and resurrect the action."66 
The court analyzed the relationship of the child and the father, 
prior to the child's death, and determined that the father had not 
forfeited his rights nor obligations as a parent. 67 This forfeiture test 
was used in Mahnke where the court held that the father's estate 
was not entitled to use the immunity defense, because the father's 
intentional tort against his daughter had led to forfeiture of his 
59. Id. at 145, 571 A.2d at 1222. 
60. Id. (citing Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 562-67, 505 A.2d 826, 836-39 (1986». 
61. Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. at 567, 505 A.2d at 839. But see HARPER, supra note 
5, at 574-76 (agreeing with the rationale put forth by courts abrogating 
immunity because of the existence of vehicle liability insurance). 
62. Smith, 319 Md. at 149, 571 A.2d at 1224. 
63. Id. at 144, 571 A.2d at 1221. 
64. Id. at 148, 571 A.2d at 1223-24. 
65. Id. Wrongful death and survival actions have long been codified in Maryland. 
The wrongful death statute was enacted in 1852. Acts of 1852, ch. 299 § 1. 
The survival statute was enacted in 1798. Acts of 1798, ch. 101, sub. ch. 8, 
§ 5. 
66. Id. at 150, 571 A.2d at 1224. 
67. Id. at 148, 571 A.2d at 1223. 
1990) Parent-Child Immunity 285 
parental rights.68 The court's application of this test in Smith suggests 
that it might make an exception to the rule in a negligence action, 
if it were shown that the defendant parent had "abandoned the 
parental relationship.' '69 
v. ANALYSIS 
In Smith, the Court of Appeals of Maryland applied parental 
immunity to wrongful death and survival actions. Although the 
decision is consistent with precedent70 in negligence actions, it is 
inconsistent with the modern trend and view of most commentators.71 
The court should have examined the sound logic behind the modern 
trend towards abrogation, and should have held the parent-child 
immunity doctrine invalid as applied to wrongful death and survival 
actions. 
A primary weakness in the court's reasoning in Smith is that it 
fails to distinguish between situations where the policy behind the 
immunity rule can be furthered by its application, and situations 
where no policy can be furthered. For example, in holding the parent-
child immunity rule applicable in wrongful death and survival actions, 
the court stressed that public policy requires supporting family unity 
and protecting parental discretion in the discipline and care of the 
child.72 The court failed to explain, however, how the policy will be 
served by applying the immunity rule in cases where the parent-child 
relationship is terminated by death. 
This is the illogical reasoning the dissent questioned.73 While the 
dissent agreed with the majority that under Maryland precedent the 
immunity would have applied had the child lived, it argued that the 
immunity defense should not be placed in the same category as other 
derivative defenses74 in wrongful death or survival actions.7s Using 
68. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 68, 77 A.2d 923, 926 (1951). 
69. Smith, 319 Md. at 148, 571 A.2d at 1223. 
70. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text; see also Montz v. Mendaloff, 
40 Md. App. 220, 388 A.2d 568 (1978) (minor child injured when an automobile 
was negligently driven by the mother even though the mother's negligence may 
have been gross); Sanford v. Sanford, 15 Md. App. 390, 290 A.2d 812 (1972) 
(minor child injured when an automobile was negligently driven by father); 
Latz v. Latz, 10 Md. App. 720, 272 A.2d 435, cert. denied, 261 Md. 726 
(1971) (mother killed while a passenger in an automobile negligently driven by 
her minor daughter). But see Montz, 40 Md. App. at 226-29, 388 A.2d at 571-
73 (Gilbert, C.J., concurring). 
71. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. 
72. Smith, 319 Md. at 146, 571 A.2d at 1222-23. 
73. Id. at 150, 571 A.2d at 1224-25 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). 
74. "Circumstances such as contributory negligence and assumption of risk [and 
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the same rationale espoused by many courts and commentators 
advocating abrogation in these actions, the dissent reasoned that the 
death which led to the action precludes the policy of preserving the 
parent-child relationship from being served.76 
The majority interpreted the survival and wrongful death statutes 
as permitting only those actions that could have been successfully 
maintained by the decedent, had the decedent lived. 77 The majority 
arrived at this conclusion by focusing on the phrase, "a personal 
action which the decedent might have commenced or prosecuted"78 
from the survival statute, and the phrase, "which would have entitled 
the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages if death 
had not ensued"79 from the wrongful death statute. Read literally, 
the language of these statutes seems to bar a wrongful death or 
survival action where parental immunity would have prevented the 
suit had the decedent lived. Therefore, on its face the majority's 
conclusion appears to be valid. 
The dissent, however, looked beyond this seemingly valid con-
clusion to find an error in its logic. The conclusion is illogical because 
no policy can be served by application of the immunity rule in this 
case. The existing parent-child relationship was severed by the child's 
death. The dissent correctly pointed out that this reasoning was 
previously used by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in making two 
exceptions to the rule. 80 In Mahnke, an outrageous intentional tort 
severed the parent-child relationship; in Waltzinger, emancipation 
severed the relationship; and in Smith, death severed the relationship. 
In all three of these circumstances no policy can be served by 
application of the immunity rule. 
The dissent further argued that where the defenses of contribu-
tory negligence, assumption of risk, and lack of privity suggests that 
there is no cognizable cause of action, the parental immunity defense 
means that although there is a cognizable cause of action, the action 
will not be permitted because of overriding policy concerns.81 If the 
facts of a case are such that these policy concerns cannot be ad-
dressed, as in wrongful death and survival actions, then it is illogical 
lack of privity] bar every tort action, regardless of the identity or relationship 
of the parties." Id. at 152, 571 A.2d at 1226 (emphasis added). 
75. Id. at 150-53, 571 A.2d at 1224-26. The Smith dissent contends that, "[a]n 
immunity such as parent-child immunity, on the other hand, does not mean 
that no cause of action exists. It means that a recovery will not be permitted 
because of overriding public policy." Id. at 152, 571 A.2d at 1226. 
76. Id. at 154-55, 571 A.2d at 1226-27. 
77. Id. at 143, 571 A.2d at 1221. 
78. /d. at 142, 571 A.2d at 1221 (citing the Maryland survival statute). 
79. Id. at 143, 571 A.2d at 1221 (citing the Maryland wrongful death statute). 
80. Id. at 154, 571 A.2d at 1226 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). 
81. Id. at 152-53, 571 A.2d at 1225-26. 
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to apply the immunity rule. The statutes, described by the court as 
"clear and certain,"82 are certainly flexible enough to allow for a 
cause of action where no policy can be served by precluding the 
action. 
A further weakness in the majority's reasoning is its insistence 
that any exception to the immunity rule must be made by the 
legislature.83 This follows Frye where the court refused to make a 
motor tort exception, reasoning that such an exception would affect 
legislatively created compulsory liability insurance laws.84 Consistent 
with that decision, the court in Smith declined to make an exception 
to the immunity which would affect the legislatively created wrongful 
death and survival actions.8s The court inferred, from the legislature's 
failure to expressly except the immunity in these actions, that the 
legislature intends for the immunity to apply in such actions.86 
There are two flaws in the Smith majority's reasoning with 
respect to the legislature's inaction. First, the legislature could not 
have excluded the immunity rule from application in wrongful death 
or survival actions when those statutes were enacted, because they 
were enacted long before the Maryland judiciary adopted the im-
munity rule. 87 In addition, the legislature has never acted to explicitly 
amend the statutes to include the immunity rule within the wrongful 
death and survival statutes. It may be that the legislature does not 
view the immunity defense as applicable in such actions, and there-
fore, has seen no need to expressly exclude the immunity from them. 
This legislative silence leaves the decision squarely with the jUdiciary. 
This leads to the majority's second flaw with respect to the 
legislature's inaction. As the dissent noted, the parental immunity 
rule is a judicial creation, not a legislative one.88 In addition, the 
court has not hesitated to make exceptions to the rule where policy 
would not be served by its application.89 While the circumstances of 
82. [d. at 149, 571 A.2d at 1224. 
83. [d. 
84. Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 567, 505 A.2d 826, 839 (1986). 
85. Smith, 319 Md. at 149, 571 A.2d at 1224. 
86. The Smith majority stated: "If the legislature intended that the judicially 
created parent-child immunity rule be excepted from the legislatively created 
survival and wrongful death action, it has had ample opportunity to say so." 
[d. at 149, 571 A.2d at 1224. 
87. The Maryland judiciary adopted the parent-child immunity doctrine in Schnei-
der v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930), whereas the survival statute 
was enacted in 1798, Acts of 1798, ch. 101, subch. 8, § 5, and the wrongful 
death statute was enacted in 1852, Acts of 1852, ch. 299, § 1. 
88. Smith, 319 Md. at 156, 571 A.2d at 1227 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). 
89. See Hatzinicolas v. Protopapas, 314 Md. 340, 550 A.2d 947 (1988) (immunity 
will not bar child's recovery in negligence from parent's business partner); 
Waitzinger v. Birsner, 212 Md. 107, 128 A.2d 617 (1957) (immunity will not 
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Mahnke (intentional tort) and Waltzinger (emancipated child) are 
different from the circumstances of Smith (death of child resulting 
from negligence), the premise used by the court of appeals to make 
exceptions to the immunity rule in Mahnke and Waltzinger is just 
as valid when applied to Smith. That premise is that the circumstances 
of the case are such that the policies behind the immunity rule cannot 
be furthered by its application to the case. This same reasoning has 
led numerous other courts to take the initiative and except the 
immunity in wrongful death actions instead of waiting for their 
legislatures to do SO.90 
VI. IMPACT lRAMIFICATION 
Nevertheless, the Smith court's application of the parent-child 
immunity doctrine to wrongful death and survival actions reinforces 
the Maryland judiciary's commitment to the doctrine. Barring action 
by the legislature to except immunity in these situations, it appears 
that Maryland's erosion of this doctrine ended with Mahnke and 
Waftzinger. 
The decision in Smith hints at only a single possibility that 
judicial exception to immunity will be made in a wrongful death or 
survival action. This small window of opportunity appears in the 
majority's analysis of the defendant parent's relationship to the child 
prior to the child's death.91 The court suggests that it would make 
an exception to the immunity in a wrongful death action if the 
defendant parent had forfeited his or her parental rights and obli-
gations. Although not as clear, an exception based on this same 
reasoning might also be made in a negligence action where no death 
had resulted. 
Parental immunity should be viewed as a flexible policy to be 
applied only when the policy overrides the importance of compen-
sating the injured person. This is the view that led the Court of 
bar recovery by emancipated child); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 
923 (1951) (intentional tort by father against daughter resulted in forfeiture of 
parental right to immunity). 
The Smith dissent contended: 
"In both [Mahnke) and [Waitzinger), where no parent-child relationship 
still existed, the Court did not recognize an immunity. In this case, the death 
of Gross, Jr. severed the parent-child relationship and terminated the basis for 
immunity." Smith, 319 Md. at 154,571 A.2d at 1226 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). 
90. See, e.g., Barnwell v. Cordle, 438 F .2d 236 (5th Cir. 1971); Brennecke v. 
Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960); Dorsey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 9 Ohio St. 3d 27, 457 N.E.2d 1169 (1984). 
91. Smith, 319 Md. at 148, 571 A.2d at 1223. 
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Appeals of Maryland to make an exception in Mahnke. 92 Had the 
court in Smith continued with the reasoning espoused in Mahnke 
and Waltzinger, the result in Smith may have been different. As in 
these earlier cases, no policy can be furthered by application of 
parental immunity in Smith. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The decision leaves a wide gap between the law in Maryland 
and the modern trend with respect to parental immunity in both 
negligence actions, and wrongful death and survival actions. The 
court rejected the modern view that even if retention of the rule is 
justified by public policy, it should not be extended beyond the 
bounds necessary to achieve the policy goals. Instead, the court held 
that immunity applies in wrongful death and survival actions, despite 
the fact that no policy can be furthered by such application. There-
fore, without legislative action, Maryland courts will continue to cling 
to the parent-child immunity doctrine. 
Sallie M. Brinkley 
92. See Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 67, 77 A.2d 923, 925 (1951) (quoting 
Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930) with approval). The court 
in Dunlap stated the following view of the parental immunity rule: 
On its face, the rule is a harsh one. It denies protection to the weak 
upon the ground that in this relation the administration of justice has 
been committed to the strong and that authority must be maintained. 
It should not be tolerated at all except for very strong reasons; and 
it should never be extended beyond the bounds compelled by those 
reasons. 
[d. at 909. 
